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NOTES AND COMMENTS
MITIGATION OF DAMAGES FOR
ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF EXECUTORY CONTRACTS
F EW questions in the field of contract law are as unsettled as
those involving the measure of damages for breach of an
agreement. The basic theory underlying the remedy is to give the
innocent party an amount in money that will, as nearly as pos-
sible, be the equivalent of the value he would have received had
the contract been fully performed. This principle in itself pre-
cludes any rigid tests. Each fact situation will vary the value of
performance and the loss by breach; proof may be limited and
difficult. The problem has received even less agreement in its
treatment by the courts where the injury is the result of an antici-
patory breach of an executory contract,' and in these instances
lack of unanimity is largely prompted by opposing views on miti-
gation of the resulting damages.
This situation has received the attention of the Federal Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Reliance Cooperage Corporation
v Treat.2 The opinion delivered by Judge Sanborn appears to pre-
sent a clear, direct statement of the law controlling the situation.
However, the total lack of any discussion of opposing doctrine
would seem to point up uncertainty.
This Comment is limited to a presentation of the Treat case as
it affects the divergent opinions that exist relative to the question
of whether or not there exists a duty to mitigate damages for
anticipatory breach of contract.
In St. Louis, Missouri, on July 12, 1950, A. R. Treat entered
into a contract to sell to the Reliance Cooperative Corporation
300,000 white oak bourbon staves at a fixed price, total delivery
' The repudiation of a contract by one of the parties before time of performance has
arrived amounts to a tender of a breach of the entire contract and, when accepted, is
anticipatory breach of the contract as a whole. Pollack v. Pollack, 46 S. W. 2d 292 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1932).
2 195 F. 2d 977 (1952).
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to be completed by December 31, 1950. Treat failed to produce
and deliver any staves. In August defendant Treat advised plaintiff
Corporation that due to a rise in price he could not produce or
deliver any staves unless a new purchase price was set. Plaintiff
answered to the effect that it expected complete performance under
the contract as originally agreed. After time for performance had
expired, the Corporation brought an action to recover damages for
the breach. The trial court instructed the jury that plaintiff Cor-
poration had a duty to mitigate the damages and that the measure
of entitlement would be the difference between the market value
at the time of repudiation and the contract price. The court of
appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial limited to ascer-
taining the amount of damages in keeping with its directions. The
court held that there was no duty to mitigate damages and that
the amount due the plaintiff would be the difference between mar-
ket value at the time when performance was due under the contract
and the original contract price.
Quoting from Claes and Lehenbeuter Mfg. Co. v. McCord,' the
court set out the general rule applied to repudiation of a sales con-
tract prior to performance date:
... The law is that, where the promisor before the time of perform-
ance expressly renounces his contract, the promisee is thereby entitled
either to treat the contract as broken and sue at once for its breach
without averring an offer of readiness to perform, or he may wait until
the time of performance has expired, and then sue for the consequences
of nonperformance.
On the general subject of anticipatory breach by repudiation,
this statement seems accurately to express the basic theory as
stated in most jurisdictions.4 The doctrine affects the time when
suit may be brought and is considered to have no other impact or
changing effect on the legal consequences of nonperformance. The
8365 Mo. App. 507, 509 (1896).
4 Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1 (1900) ; see Limburg, Anticipatory Repudiation of
Contracts, 10 Cornell L. Q. 135 (1924). "The doctrine of alloviing recovery for an
anticipatory breach of contracts is recognized in Texas." Englehart v. Volunteer State
Life Ins. Co., 195 S. W. 2d 798, 802 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) er. ref.
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purpose is to afford the injured party an election to accept or
reject repudation without forcing added burdens upon him. It is
clear that a party may sue at the time of breach or choose to insist
upon performance. If the later election is made, the contract is
said to remain binding, and no right to damages arises until the
date of performance expires.5 The court, in emphasizing that antici-
patory breach has no special effect other than on the time of suit,
noted the comment in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts that
"repudiation does not accelerate the time fixed for performance;
nor does it change the damages to be awarded.. ."6 It would seem
that this is too simple an approach.
In the ordinary breach of a contract of sale the difference be.
tween the contract price and market price at the time and place of
performance is the accepted measure of damages.7 There may ap.
pear to be no logical reason for departing from this rule. However,
where a contract is repudiated before performance date, there may
be a long period of time between date of breach and when per.
formance is due. This circumstance makes likely changes in value
of the subject of the contract and certainly affects the opportunity
to avoid or materially to reduce the damages resulting from the
breach. Arbitrary use of market price at performance date as a
measure of damages overlooks two main problems: (1) at what
time does the market price of the commodity concerned have a
bearing on the damages for nonperformance and what evidence is
relevant in determining this? (2) is there a duty to mitigate the
damages resulting from repudiation?
Where the courts have held that the market price at the time
of repudiation applies, the reasoning has not always been clear.
5 Roehm v. Horst, supra note 4; see authorities collected in 12 AM. JuR., Contracts,
§§ 392, 397; 17 C. J. S., Contracts, § 472.
6 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 338; see 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed.
1937) § 1397; 46 AM. Jui., Sales, § 688.
7 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1937) § 1397; 2 SEDCWICK, DAMAGES (9th ed.
1912) § 636 (d) ; Notes, 44 A. L. R. 215, 218 (1926), 108 A. L. R. 1482, 1485 (1937),
.and cases cited therein. The question presented by the principal case does not arise




In some instances it has been based upon a duty to mitigate the
damages;' in others there appeared to be no difference between
market price at time of repudiation and on the date of perform-
ance.9 An indefinite date for performance or no date set out in the
agreement has been urged as necessitating use of market price at
breach as determinative." Where the trial precedes the perform-
ance date, the market price at the time of breach may be the only
evidence available for ascertaining the amount of damages." The
opinions indicate that using a date other than this produces too
speculative a problem for the jury. This attitude appears unsound
when one considers jury findings concerning damages in other types
of actions, such as for mental anguish. At least one writer suggests
that using the market price on the date of breach is treating the
breach as a failure to give performance at that time and has the
effect of calling for an obligation other than that which the parties
originally undertook. 2
The court was on firm ground in asserting that normally no
duty to mitigate damages can arise until there are damages to miti-
gate. However, this premise does not necessarily lead to the court's
conclusions. In stating that in the instant case damages accrued on
the date performance was due under the contract, the opinion
points out that, despite his repudiation, defendant Treat was obli-
gated to produce and deliver staves; if he had done so, the plain-
tiff would have had to accept and pay for them. "There is no justi-
fication for ruling that, after the plaintiff was advised that the de-
fendant did not intend to perform, it must hold itself in readiness
to accept performance from him and at the same time, at its own
8 Cox & Sons Co. v. Crane Iron Works, 5 F. 2d 314 (3d Cir. 1925), later proceedings,
28 F. 2d 328 (3d Cir. 1928) ; Goldsmith v. Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 255, 200 N. W. 252 (1924).
9 Lompoc Produce and Real Estate Co. v. Brown, 41 Cal. App. 607, 182 Pac. 166
(1919) ; Sharpsville Furnace Co. v. Snyder, 223 Pa. 372, 72 Atl. 786 (1909).
10 O'Dell v. Nelson & Myers, 182 Okla. 563, 79 P. 2d 212 (1928) ; Benedict v. Harris,
158 Ore. 613, 77 P. 2d 442 (1938).
11 In re Marshall's Garage, 63 F. 2d 759 (2d Cir. 1933) ; Cox & Sons Co. v. Crane
Iron Works, cited supra note 8; Goldfarb v. Campe Corp., 99 Misc. 475, 164 N. Y. Supp.
583 (1917).
12 See Beale, Anticipatory Repudiation of Contracts, 17 Yale L. J. 443, 448 (1908).
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risk and expense, buy the staves.., upon the open market ... "I'
This view fails to consider the limits to nullification of an antici-
patory breach.14 True, one who repudiates an executory contract
prior to performance date may nullify his repudiation, but this
right or privilege does not continue indefinitely. If, in considering
the repudiation as an "offer to terminate," the other party accepts
such offer, there can then be no nullification - only a new con-
tract. Similarly, if the position of the other party is so changed by
the repudiation that it could not reasonably be supposed that he
will agree to nullification, the contract is considered terminated.
Following this reasoning, it is logical to point out that had the
plaintiff Corporation gone out on the open market and bought
staves other than those contracted for, nullification of the breach
would have been precluded.
To present what it considered to be the general rule on mitiga-
tion of damages in this country, the court of appeals turned to
another federal case, Continental Grain Co. v. Simpson Feed Co.,
and quoted from it:
. .. [T] he general rule in the United States is that a buyer who refuses
to accept a seller's anticipatory refusal to deliver the commodities
contracted for, and who insists upon performance by the latter, is not
required to go upon the open market and purchase upon receipt of
notice that the seller does not intend to perform. He has a right to treat
the notice as inoperative, to wait until the time for performance has
passed, and then buy on the open market, charging the seller with the
difference between the contract price of the goods and the market price
which prevailed at the time that performance should have been forth-
coming.16
An imposing group of authorities is listed in support of this rule."
13195 F. 2d at 982.
14 Rothschild, Anticipatory Contract Repudiation and its Nullification-State and
Federal Courts, 31 Iowa L. Rev. 383 (1946).15 102 F. Supp. 354 (E. D. Ark. 1951).
1 Id. at 363.
'7 Including Callan v. Andrews, 48 F. 2d 118 (2d Cir. 1931) ; Mission Furnace Co.
v. Cochran, 8 Fed. 463 (W. D. Pa. 1881) ; Walker-Smith Co. v. Bilao, 204 S. W. 777(Tex. Civ. App. 1918) ; 15 AM. JuR., Damages, § 50; 46 AM. JUR., Sales, §§ 678, 681,
688; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1937) §§ 1337, 1383, 1387; 1 R.STAT.MNT,
CONTRACTS (1932) § 338.
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There can be no doubt that there are strong grounds for this
conclusion. Roehm v. Horst,"5 often cited for this view, is one of
the first cases to distinguish between the privilege to cover for self-
protection and the duty to mitigate and lessen damages. On the
risky basis that the case involved the former problem only, it was
deemed to support a rule denying the duty to mitigate. Any dis-
tinction between privilege and duty in this instance is at most
tenuous. The same criticism can be made of the claim that certain
other cases deny a duty to mitigate, 9 where, in effect, it has been
said that a party is not under a duty to avoid additional damages,
but rather is prevented from recovering those which he might have
avoided. This is simply verbiage used for purposes of justification.
A 1949 federal case,20 in considering mitigation, stated that the
market price at the date performance was due, not at the time of
the anticipatory breach, was the measure of damages. Both Barto-
lotta v. Calvo2' and Segall v. Finlay" held the general rule to be
that the buyer is under no obligation to buy similar goods from
other sources where seller's refusal to deliver is made known prior
to performance date. In an 1887 United States Supreme Court
case23 the duty to mitigate was clearly denied. More recently, the
author of a treatise on contract law rejects the rule establishing a
duty to mitigate, largely on the basis of the financial risk resulting
from the unknown and precarious character of the market.2
18 178 U. S. 1, 20 (1900) : "As to questions of damages, if the action is not premature,
the rule is applicable that plaintiff is entitled to compensation based, as far as possible
on the ascertaining of what he would have suffered by the continued breach by the
other party down to the time of complete performance, less any abatement by reason
of circumstances of which he ought reasonably to have availed himself."
19 Rock v. Vandine, 106 Kan. 588, 189 Pac. 157 (1920) ; Craig, Thompson & Jefferies
v. Barreda, 200 S. W. 868 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
2
o Joseph Denunzio Fruit Co. v. Crane, 79 F. Supp. 117 (S. D. Cal. 1948).
21 112 Conn. 385, 152 At]. 306 (1930).
22 126 Misc. 625, 213 N. Y. Supp. 540 (1925), af'd, 218 N. Y. Supp. 895 (App. Div.
1926).
2s Huckley v. Bessemer Steel Co., Ltd., 121 U. S. 264.
24 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS (1951) § 1053: "In the case of contracts for the future
delivery of goods, it has been suggested by a number of courts that, if either the buyer
or the seller commits an anticipatory breach, the other party must attempt to mitigate
his losses by making another forward-looking contract to buy or sell similar goods, pro-
vided that such an attempt seems reasonable under the circumstances. This suggested
[Vol. 7
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On careful analysis, it seems that at least two authorities may
not uphold the proposition for which they are cited in the principal
case and in many other opinions. In Callan v. Andrews25 Judge
Learned Hand stated:
That there may be circumstances which will impose on the promisee
a duty to cover, we need not deny, though they must be indeed rare.
Ordinarily we cannot agree that it is reasonable to require him to
divine the course of an 'obviously' changing market about which no
one's judgment is of any value.
He then referred to an organized market in futures of grain and
cotton on the exchange as the "circumstances" which he noted.
Aligning this statement with the advocates of no mitigation de-
mands that Judge Hand meant to limit any duty to mitigate to
such instances as he specified. It is equally reasonable, however, to
read Judge Hand's language as excluding extremely speculative
exchange transactions as were considered in that case, and imply.
ing a duty to mitigate where the market has any substantial degree
of certainty, as do most commodities ordinarily contracted for sale.
The second authority is Section 338 of the Restatement of the
Law of Contracts, which possibly is misinterpreted. Support for
denying a duty to mitigate the damages resulting from repudiation
apparently rests on the general rule of the Section. 6 But the
inquiry must go deeper. Comment (c) cannot be ignored, and it
robs the devil of his cloak:
After an anticipatory breach is known to the injured party, just as
in the case of other kinds of breach, the damages that will be awarded
are limited by the rule as to avoidable harm. He is not permitted,
merely because the breach is anticipatory, to enhance his damages by
rule should not be accepted; and, in several cases, the courts have in fact refused to
follow it. It requires the injured party to forecast the unknown future for the benefit
of the repudiator. If his forecast is wrong, either he suffers extra loss or such extra loss
is thrown on the repudiator, depending on the jury's idea of whether or not the plaintiff
was a bad prophet. There is financial risk involved in the making of any such forward
contract; and no contractor should be required by the law to run such a risk ..
2548 F. 2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1931).
26 In effect it says that the rules for determining the damages recoverable for an
anticipatory breach are the same as in the case of a breach at the time fixed for per.
formance.
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unreasonably continuing his own performance or unreasonably omit-
ting action that would prevent harm.
A line of decisions in New York agree with the principal case
in holding that there is no duty to mitigate damages for anticipa-
tory breach.27 These opinions, however, are based on language of
a section of the Uniform Sales Act, enacted in that jurisdiction.2"
The section is almost identical with the corresponding section of
the English Act.29 England has long held that there exists a duty
to mitigate in instances of repudiation - the buyer must cover,
the seller must unload.3" The one difference in the American and
English sections is the added language of the American statute,
Section 67 (3), "in the absence of special circumstances showing
proximate damages of a greater amount." This clause is the ap-
parent justification for the New York holdings. Although this inter-
pretation is convenient, it hardly seems necessary.
Made glaringly evident by their complete omission in the instant
opinion are sound bases for recognizing a duty to mitigate the
damages resulting from repudiation of an executory contract of
sale. The general rule of mitigation extends to a present breach
27 Including Segall v. Finlay, 245 N. Y. 61, 156 N. E. 97 (1927); Goldfarb v. Campe
Corp., 99 Misc. 475, 164 N. Y. Supp. 583 (1917).
2s Sec. 67 (Action for failing to deliver goods.)
(1) Where the property in the goods has not passed to the buyer, and the seller
wrongfully neglects or refuses to deliver the goods, the buyer may maintain an action
against the seller for damages for non-delivery.
(2) The measure of damages is the loss directly and naturally resulting in the
ordinary course of events, from the seller's breach of contract.
(3) When there is an available market for the goods in question, the measure
of damages, in the absence of special circumstances showing proximate damages
of a greater amount, is the difference between the contract price and the market
or current price of the goods at the time or times when they ought to have been
delivered, or, if no time was fixed, then at the time of the refusal to deliver.
The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (Official Draft, Text & Comments Ed. 1952) §§
2-706 and 2-711, -712 provides methods for determining damages for repudiation by
either party to a contract for the sale of goods. It permits resale by the seller or "cover-
ing" purchases by the buyer. However, the Code does not require this action, but rather
affords such as an alternative to the remedy set forth in § 2-713.
29 Sale of Goods Act, 56 & 57 VICT. c. 71, § 51 (1894).
0 'Melachrino v. Nickoll & Knight, [1920] 1 K. B. 693, 89 L. J. K. B. 906, 122 L. T.
545 (repudiation by seller).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
and certainly implies a duty."' The duty has been widely accepted
as applicable to anticipatory breach of contracts for the manu-
facture of goods and for labor."' There is no good reason to limit
the doctrine to those types of contracts. Indeed, there is nothing
unreasonable or unjust in asking a party to take steps looking far
ahead to mitigate his losses when the very contract he originally
made and the conduct of normal business transactions require
maximum farsightedness. Any such business transaction has a cer-
tain element of "crystal-gazing." This is borne out in the relatively
few cases like the principal decision. Most views on mitigation
appear in decisions where the injured party has made a substitute
forward contract and sues for loss thereunder, not where there has
been inaction until after the performance date of the original con-
tract and a suit for damages is brought thereafter."3 Most parties
to a breached contract of sale go ahead in some alternative manner
to continue their productivity and to keep alive and active their
commercial enterprises, looking to a recovery of the difference
between the value of the second contract or act of substitution and
the value of the original contract.
In jurisdictions where the Uniform Sales Act prevails, there
would appear every reason to follow the English rule (that the
injured party must mitigate), since the pertinent sections in the
two Acts are almost identical. The fallacy of finding justification
for a different interpretation based on slight changes in wording
has already been pointed out.
There is a strong line of cases recognizing the propriety and duty
31 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 336 (1): "Damages are not recoverable
for harm that the plaintiff should have foreseen and could have avoided by reasonable
effort without undue risk, expense, or humiliation."
32 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1937) §§ 1298, 1397.
3s Hebron Mfg. Co. v. Powell Knitting Co., 171 Fed. 817 (3d Cir. 1909); Renner
Co. v. McNeff Bros., 102 F. 2d 664 (6th Cir. 1939) ; In re Chinook Lumber & Mfg. Co.,
100 F. 2d 268 (9th Cir. 1938).
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of mitigation." In Mogilensky v. Abramson88 the court plainly
stated that there was a duty to buy other goods between the time
of breach and the date when performance was due. In several in-
stances the federal courts have sustained this theory. 6
In concluding its opinion in the principal case the court again
looked to the Continental Grain Co. decision for reasons behind the
rule it adopted. These reasons were, first, to prevent the encourage-
ment of repudiation by buyers or sellers as the market fluctuates;
second, to prevent possible enhancing rather than lessening of the
injured party's damages. The first reason is faulty in that it pre-
supposes all parties to an executory sales contract to be ready, if
not anxious, to default on their promises. It is hoped this is not
true. Also, the reasoning does not consider the business value of
sales contracts themselves, and the normal economic compulsion
on businesses to abide by their undertakings. The second reason
loses weight in face of the rule that the injured party may recover
for losses sustained through reasonable acts of mitigation."
Other bases have been advanced for denying a duty to mitigate
in this situation.88 One is the argument of an undue burden on an
innocent party. This is refuted by the protection afforded under
the usual application of the mitigation doctrine. The duty to miti-
gate goes no further than the limits of reasonableness. Still another
argument states that the innocent party should be allowed to use
34 Jebeles & Colias Confectionery Co. v. Stephenson, 6 Ala. App. 103, 60 So. 437
(1912) ; Mendel v. Converse & Co., 30 Ga. App. 549, 118 S. E. 586 (1923) ; Central
Lumber Co. v. Arkansas Valley Lumber Co., 86 Kan. 131, 119 Pac. 321 (1911) ; York.
Draper Mercantile Co. v. Lusk, 6 Kan. App. 629, 49 Pac. 788 (1897) ; Goldsmith v.
Stiglitz, 228 Mich. 255, 200 N. W. 252 (1924) ; Oklahoma Candy & Commission Co. v.
Liquid Carbonic Co., 107 Okla. 100, 230 Pac. 250 (1924) ; Key v. Kingswood Oil Co.,
110 Okla. 178, 236 Pac. 598 (1924).
35 164 N. Y. Supp. 700 (Sup. Ct., App. Term, 1917).
ss Crane Iron Works v. Cox & Sons Co., 28 F. 2d 328 (3d Cir. 1928) ; Samuels v.
E. F. Drew & Co., Inc., 292 Fed. 734 (2d Cir. 1923) ; Skeele Coal Co. v. Arnold, 200
Fed. 393 (2d Cir. 1912).
37 "Damages are recoverable for special losses incurred in a reasonable effort, whether
successful or not, to avoid harm that the defendant had reason to foresee as a probable
result of his breach when the contract was made." 1 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932)
§ 336 (2).
38 See Note, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 538 (1949).
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his money or credit as he sees fit. It must be recognized that the
money or credit available to him is free for use only because of
the premature breach. Perhaps one further reason might be offered,
i.e., that a rule denying a duty to mitigate damages, while negative
in its approach, is certain and easy to apply. This logic has cer-
tainly never met great favor with American courts in other fields
of law.
The principle held forth by the court of appeals goes too far -
becomes too rigid. It requires only inaction by the injured party
irrespective of how long the time may be between breach and per-
formance date, regardless of how advantageous a substitute con-
tract might be, and without conscience in the matter of a fall in
prices. On the other hand, the rule recognizing the duty adjusts it-
self to the reasonableness of anticipating damages as governed by
the nature of the commodity and the market.
Today's trend and development of the theory and practice of
contract law would seem to point toward recognition of a duty to
mitigate damages in these situations. The control and regulation
of business by government steadily works toward standardization
of business practices and conduct, which include contracts of sale.
Mobility and freedom of the right to contract are sacrificed for
security and stability. As the government promotes business opera-
tion which recognizes broad social-economic needs and subsidizes
its very existence, it demands more regimented production and
stable, constant commercial activity. Where sales contracts are pre-
maturely breached, such policy would demand a new forward
contract to prevent interruption of commerce. Where the govern-
ment itself is contracting with the injured party for the commodity
which is subject of the breach, it would demand acts of mitigation
to secure and assure its receipt of the goods. Where price controls
exist, the "crystal-gazing" nature of the market, said to burden
unjustly the innocent party, may not be a reality. Too, although
19531
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impossibility has normally been no excuse for failure to perform, 9
except in certain limited categories, 0 the doctrine of frustration
has been broadened because of the impact of government partici-
pation on many business contracts. Since the seller has the benefit
of this extended frustration doctrine and since the government
expects performance by the buyer with whom it is dealing, mitiga-
tion becomes not an onerous duty placed on the injured party,
but rather a means of his protection - to save what he can.
Even if government control of economic activity lessens, the
duty to mitigate damages flows from a sound general principle,
one attuned to a free economy. The freedom of the individual to
contract without impairment is a right to contract "wisely or un-
wisely as long as lawfully." Mitigation of damages when a contract
is breached is not an unjust imposition but is a proper exercise
of that right.
The Treat decision will undoubtedly lend support to proponents
denying the duty. This seems to be in opposition to the best inter-
ests of contracting parties and to the promotion of sound economic
aims.
Charles Burgman.
39 Powell v. State, 118 S. W. 2d 960 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) er. rel.; American Fidelity
and Gas Co. v. Williams, 34 S. W. 2d 396 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (hardship does not
excuse failure to perform).
406 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1938) § 1935.
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